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THE THREE FACES OF PROMETHEUS: 
A POST-ALICE JURISPRUDENCE OF ABSTRACTIONS 
 
Jeffrey A. Lefstin* 
 
While Alice v. CLS Bank has confirmed that patent claims require 
a further “inventive concept” beyond an underlying abstract idea 
or law of nature for patent-eligibility, there is little agreement on 
what defines either an “abstract idea” or an “inventive concept.” 
Resolving this uncertainty is critical to determining the 
patent-eligibility of software claims beyond the simple “do it on a 
computer” type invalidated in Alice. This Article argues that the 
rationale and two-step analysis articulated in Mayo and Alice 
represents a fundamental reorientation of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, effectively superseding the Court’s earlier § 101 
cases. Based on the structure of the Mayo/Alice test, this Article 
argues for a differentiated framework of “inventive concept,” 
requiring inventive application for most abstract ideas, but only 
non-generic application for most laws of nature. Under this 
framework, two key classes of subject matter remain 
patent-eligible: (1) claims that do more than reveal the results of 
an underlying law of nature, and (2) claims to specific and 
inventive information-processing techniques. 
  
                                                
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law. I thank 
Bernard Chao, Andrew Chin, Kevin Collins, and other participants at the 
Symposium, as well as Ben Depoorter, Robin Feldman, and my other colleagues 
at UC Hastings, for their useful comments. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter delineates the 
domain of the patent system: what constitutes an “invention or 
discovery”1 that may be the subject of a patent. Qualification as 
patent-eligible subject matter is the beginning, not the end of the 
question of patentability; even if an invention is patent-eligible, it 
must meet the statutory requirements of utility, novelty, 
non-obviousness, adequate disclosure, and definite claiming before 
it can be awarded a patent. 
After leaving the doctrine in the hands of the lower courts for 
nearly thirty years, the Supreme Court has issued four decisions on 
the doctrine in the span of five years.2 Yet there is now less clarity 
on the basic question of patent-eligibility than at almost any other 
time in American patent law. After the Court’s latest decision, 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank,3 it is clear that a basic principle of 
business or economics, coupled with a direction to “do it on a 
computer” or “do it on the Internet,” is not patent-eligible subject 
matter. Scores, if not hundreds, of such patents have met their 
doom in the courts or at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”) in the wake of Alice. Yet given the Court’s 
reluctance to provide specific guidance, there is little agreement on 
how the analysis of patent-eligibility should be structured. 
Moreover, while generic implementations of modes of organizing 
human activity are clearly ineligible under Alice, the case did little 
to clarify the general question of software patentability. A critical 
question left unresolved by Alice is whether a specific 
implementation of an information processing algorithm—for 
example, a method of embedding error-correction information in a 
digital transmission—constitutes patent-eligible subject matter. 
And software is not the only field where the Court’s decisions have 
left the scope of patent-eligible subject matter unsettled. Based on 
a broad interpretation of the Court’s earlier decision in Mayo v. 
                                                
1 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2014). 
2 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass'n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
3 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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Prometheus,4 the courts and the USPTO are now invalidating a 
wide variety of claims in the biotechnological arts on the grounds 
that they are directed to ineligible laws of nature.5 But the exact 
boundary between unpatentable laws of nature and patentable 
applications remains ill-defined. 
The major obstacle to consistency and predictability in the field 
is the incoherence of the Supreme Court’s opinions. Over the last 
forty years, the Supreme Court’s subject-matter jurisprudence has 
shifted radically in both rationale and analysis not only from the 
doctrine’s historical moorings,6 but also within the Court’s modern 
cases themselves. Moreover, while in other fields the Court readily 
acknowledges the disorder of its jurisprudence,7 over the last four 
decades, the Court has pretended that its subject-matter 
jurisprudence is a coherent whole. The result is that lower tribunals 
can select from a patchwork collection of incongruous analyses 
and rationales in order to yield a desired outcome. 
But the point of this Article will not be to criticize the Court’s 
jurisprudence, nor to attempt a reconciliation of that jurisprudence 
into a coherent whole, nor to propose a grand unified theory of 
patent-eligible subject matter. Rather, this Article takes the Court’s 
decisions in Mayo and Alice as a given. Its central thesis is that the 
test of patent eligibility pronounced in Mayo and Alice represents 
an opportunity to discard much of the doctrinal detritus that has 
accumulated around the law of patent-eligible subject matter over 
the last forty years. By focusing on the structure of the Mayo/Alice 
                                                
4 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
5 See Bernard Chao & Lane Womack, USPTO Is Rejecting Potentially Life-
Saving Inventions, IP LAW 360 (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/604808/uspto-is-rejecting-potentially-life-saving-inventions. 
6 See Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No 
Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski's Superficial Textualism and the Missed 
Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
1289, 1290–91 (2011) (“The past forty years of patentable subject matter 
jurisprudence harkens back to the Israelites' wandering through the wilderness 
following the exodus from Egypt.”). 
7 See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (“In outlining the 
contours of this slim category [cases of federal ‘arising under’ jurisdiction over 
state-law claims], we do not paint on a blank canvas. Unfortunately, the canvas 
looks like one that Jackson Pollock got to first.”). 
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test, as well as the rationale for subject matter exclusions 
articulated in Mayo and Alice, this Article derives meanings for the 
key notions of “inventive concept” and “abstract idea” that the 
Court has left undefined. Under these meanings, two significant 
categories of inventions are shown to be patent-eligible subject 
matter under Mayo and Alice: specific applications of newly 
discovered laws of nature and specific, human-created 
information-processing methods that are implemented on 
computers. 
Part II of this Article briefly reviews the history of the 
patent-eligible subject matter doctrine, leading up to the Court’s 
key decisions in Mayo and Alice. Part III argues that the analytical 
framework employed by the Court in Mayo and Alice represents a 
significant break in the Court’s patent-eligibility jurisprudence, and 
that a jurisprudence of patent-eligibility should be built based upon 
the structure of that framework. Part IV then examines the 
“inventive concept” required by Mayo for patent-eligibility, 
exploring the three different notions of inventive concept 
suggested in the Mayo opinion. Part V argues, based on the theory 
that the patent system functions to incentivize technological 
development under conditions of uncertainty, that different standards 
of inventive concept should be required for inventions based on 
discovery and those inventions not based on discovery. Part VI then 
concludes that, under this framework, specific and inventive 
information-processing algorithms represent means of application 
rather than abstract ideas, and should therefore be patent-eligible 
under the Mayo/Alice test. 
II.  THE TANGLED WEB OF THE SUPREME COURT’S 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Generally speaking, American patent law from the 
mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century drew the boundary of 
patent-eligibility at practical application.8 Fundamental principles, 
such as laws of nature, were not patent-eligible in the abstract, but 
a practical application of a principle was patent-eligible provided 
                                                
8 See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 44–45, 58–59) (on file with author). 
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the inventor had sufficiently disclosed a means of application.9 
While this distinction represented the main boundary of the patent 
system, it was subject to two significant exceptions. First, courts 
usually limited the field of the patent system to the industrial or 
technological arts. 10  Second, courts generally required some 
tangible means of application for a principle to be patent-eligible.11 
Furthermore, whether derived from those two limitations or 
supplementing them, courts excluded inventions from 
patent-eligibility if they fell into the categories of “printed matter” 
and “mental steps.”12 
The Supreme Court strayed from the traditional approach in its 
first software cases, Gottschalk v. Benson13 and Parker v. Flook,14 
where it held that claims to particular practical applications of 
mathematical algorithms were not patent-eligible. But in Diamond 
v. Diehr,15 where the Court considered a claim to an automated 
process of molding rubber, the Court seemed to revert to the 
traditional standard of patent eligibility. Although the claimed 
process used a well-known algorithm to calculate when the rubber 
was fully cured, the Diehr Court found that process to be 
patent-eligible, explaining that “when a claim recites a 
mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of 
nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking 
patent protection for that formula in the abstract.”16 
Yet in its modern decisions, the Supreme Court appears to have 
turned its back on the traditional framework for patent eligibility. 
Nearly thirty years after Diehr, the Supreme Court decided Bilski 
v. Kappos,17 in which the claimed invention was a method of 
hedging risk in commodity markets. In Bilski, the Court explained 
that only one principle governed patent-eligibility under § 101: 
                                                
9 See id. (manuscript at 30). 
10 See Menell, supra note 6, at 1294–96. 
11 See Lefstin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 59). 
12 See id. (manuscript at 48). 
13 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
14 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
15 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
16 Id. at 191 (emphasis added). 
17 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
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abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena are not 
patent-eligible. While the Court declined to define those 
categories, everything the Court had said in its prior § 101 
opinions, according to Bilski, had merely been elaborations on 
those basic exclusions.18 And while Justice Stevens, joined by three 
other members of the Court, would have excluded business 
methods from patent-eligibility, the majority refused to exclude 
business methods or other non-technological inventions from 
patent-eligibility. Bilski therefore effectively repudiated the 
historical limitation of the patent system to technological or 
industrial arts. 19  Bilski also deprecated the historical focus on 
tangibility by rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-
transformation” standard as the exclusive test of patent-eligibility 
of a process under § 101.20 While Bilski allowed that the machine-
or-transformation standard (which had been raised in Benson) 
provided “a useful clue” to patent-eligibility, the Court’s 
subsequent opinions rejected arguments based on tangibility or 
physical transformation.21 
In Bilski, the Court said little about how to distinguish between 
fundamental principles and patent-eligible inventions; the Court’s 
analysis simply declared the claims at issue to be abstract ideas.22 
However, in Mayo v. Prometheus, where the disputed claims 
recited a method of determining optimal drug dosage by measuring 
the concentration of a drug metabolite, the Court articulated a new 
                                                
18 See id. at 603 (“Any suggestion in this Court's case law that the Patent Act's 
terms deviate from their ordinary meaning has only been an explanation for the 
exceptions for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”). 
19 See id. at 606–09 (rejecting exclusion for business methods). 
20 See id. at 602–06 (rejecting machine-or-transformation test as exclusive 
standard for patent-eligibility of a process). 
21 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1302–03 (2012) (holding that machine-or-transformation test does not trump 
law of nature exclusion); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 
2358–60 (2014) (stating that the fact that a computer is tangible is “beside the 
point,” and rejecting the distinction between claims to an intangible method and 
claims to a computer or data storage medium). 
22 See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 (“The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 
and reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract 
idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.”). 
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analytical framework for patent eligibility. Framing the 
patent-eligibility inquiry as a distinction between unpatentable 
laws of nature and patent-eligible applications of those laws,23 the 
Court explained that to be patent-eligible, a claim must recite a 
further “inventive concept” beyond the underlying law of nature or 
abstract idea.24 In its analysis of the invention in Mayo, the Court 
regarded the relationship between metabolite levels in the blood 
and therapeutic efficacy that had been discovered by the inventor 
as a law of nature.25 The claims in the case merely recited the 
known steps of administering the drug and determining the level of 
the metabolite, wherein specified levels of the metabolite indicated 
a need to increase or decrease dosage of the drug.26 While they 
may have represented a practical application of the law of nature, 
the claims did not “add enough” to that law of nature to constitute 
a patent-eligible application.27 
The Court’s next patent-eligibility case, Association of 
Molecular Pathology vs. Myriad Genetics,28 made no reference to 
Mayo’s “inventive concept.” The Court’s holding, that isolated and 
purified human genetic sequences were not patent-eligible, seemed 
premised only on § 101’s requirement that an invention be 
“new.” 29  However, in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 30  the Court 
confirmed that Mayo’s framework is the general test for patent 
eligibility. Mayo, as explicated in Alice, involves a two-step 
inquiry. First, determine whether a claim was directed to an 
unpatentable abstract idea or law of nature. 31  And second, 
determine whether the claim contains an inventive concept that 
transforms the claim into a patent-eligible application.32 For the 
claims at issue in Alice, which were directed to a method of 
mitigating settlement risk in financial transactions, limitations that 
                                                
23 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. at 1296–97. 
26 See id. at 1297. 
27 See id. at 1298. 
28 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
29 See id. at 2116 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
30 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
31 See id. at 2355. 
32 See id. 
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recited implementation by generic computer hardware failed to 
supply a sufficient inventive concept.33 
But the Court’s recent decisions have done more than discard 
the traditional limitations on patent-eligibility. The Court has also 
turned away from the basic rationales for subject matter exclusions 
articulated in its early modern cases. Benson and Flook rested in 
part on the rationale that the Court should await a signal from 
Congress, rather than approve extension of the patent system into 
fields not contemplated by Congress when the patent statutes were 
enacted.34 That rationale was squarely rejected in Chakrabarty, 
where the Court emphasized that patent law by its very nature 
encompassed the unanticipated and unforeseeable.35 Flook also 
grounded subject-matter exclusions in the theory that laws of 
nature and algorithms—at least algorithms that represented 
physical processes—were pre-existing aspects of the natural world, 
and not the creations of humans.36 The idea that subject-matter 
exclusions limited the patent system to human creations also has 
deep roots in the philosophy of American patent law.37 But Bilski 
implicitly, and Alice explicitly, rejected the argument that the 
category of abstract ideas was limited to preexisting, fundamental 
truths.38 In place of these rationales, Mayo and Alice justified 
subject matter exclusions on utilitarian grounds: because 
fundamental principles are ‘building blocks’ for future work, 
patents on laws of nature or abstract ideas threaten to foreclose 
                                                
33 See id. at 2359–60. 
34 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 595–96 (1978). 
35  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“Flook did not 
announce a new principle that inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress 
when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se.”); cf. id. at 319 n.2 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Flook for proposition that Court should proceed 
cautiously when asked to extend patent rights into areas not foreseen by 
Congress). 
36 Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15 (“The underlying notion is that a scientific 
principle, such as that expressed in respondent's algorithm, reveals a relationship 
that has always existed.”). 
37 See generally Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: 
History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (2011). 
38 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356–57 (discussing Bilski). 
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more innovation than they promote.39 
Even as each new case has recast the test for patent eligibility, 
as well as its underlying rationales, the Court has maintained the 
pretense that all its historical and modern subject-matter cases are 
coherent with each other. That unfortunate tradition began largely 
with Diehr, which represented a clear rejection of Flook’s directive 
to factor “inventiveness” into the § 101 inquiry. The Diehr 
majority nonetheless maintained that its approach was entirely 
consistent with Flook—over a dissent by Justice Stevens, the 
author of Flook, who quite rightly accused the majority of 
disregarding Flook and Benson as well.40 So it was quite in form 
for the Mayo Court, when it revived Flook’s suggestion that a 
claim must contain an “inventive concept” beyond an underlying 
law of nature or abstract idea, to insist that its holding in Diehr was 
consistent with this new test—leaving the Patent Office and the 
lower courts to explain why the step of opening a rubber mold was 
an inventive concept sufficient to transform an algorithm that 
calculated when the rubber in the mold was fully cured into a 
patent-eligible application.41 
Further, while the Court has established laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas as the basic exclusions from the 
patent system, the Court has declined to define those categories. 
Bilski, Mayo, and Alice simply assert that the claims at issue in 
each case embody a fundamental principle. Nor has the Court 
provided a singular definition of the “inventive concept” necessary 
for a patent-eligible application. Couple the Court’s vagueness 
with the Court’s pretense that all of its historic and modern 
subject-matter cases are consistent, and the results are predictable: 
while scores of patents—particularly software patents—have fallen 
since Alice, there is little or no consistency in how either the 
district courts or the Federal Circuit perform the § 101 analysis. 
For example, one of the Federal Circuit’s first major post-Alice 
                                                
39 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1301–03 (2012); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 1355. 
40 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 205 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
41 See 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 74,618 (Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).  
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decisions, Ultramercial v. Hulu, 42  seemed to conclude that a 
kitchen-sink approach was the safest analysis. In assessing whether 
the claims in suit embodied an inventive concept, the court’s 
majority analysis invoked the notions of routine and conventional 
activity, steps specified at a high level of generality, the 
insignificance of data-gathering steps or pre-solution activity, the 
practical monopolization of an abstract idea, the ineffectiveness of 
limitations to a particular technological environment, and the 
machine-or-transformation test. 43  For good measure, the 
concurrence argued that Alice mandates a technological arts test.44 
While Ultramercial might hold the record for the number of tests 
invoked in a single opinion, one could compile an even broader 
collection of tests, standards, and rationales from the post-Alice 
opinions of the Federal Circuit and the district courts, and the 
USPTO’s patent-eligibility guidelines as well.45 
III.  CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT 
There is a workable solution. It does not lie in embracing or 
reconciling all of the Supreme Court’s statements on patent-
eligible subject matter. Despite the hundreds, probably thousands 
of attempts in judicial opinions and academic commentaries over 
the last forty years, it is time to admit that the Supreme Court’s 
opinions cannot be reconciled. Rather, the solution is to recognize 
the significance of the Court’s reaffirmation of Mayo in Alice. For 
Mayo made three things clear. First, Mayo grounded subject-matter 
exclusions on a utilitarian rationale: fundamental principles—laws 
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas—are excluded 
because they are the “building blocks” of future advances; 
                                                
42 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
43 See id. at 715–17. 
44 See id. at 721 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
45 See John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need 
for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1765, 1775–76 (“[T]he main impression left by the USPTO's long but 
nonexhaustive list of factors is that subject-matter eligibility analysis has 
become a quagmire that a USPTO bound to an unwieldy set of judicial 
precedents will have great difficulty clearing up.”) (discussing USPTO § 101 
guidelines). 
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monopolization of these principles by patents might tend to impede 
innovation more than promote it.46 Second, Mayo defined the § 101 
inquiry as a distinction between ineligible claims to fundamental 
principles themselves and claims to patent-eligible applications of 
those principles.47 Third, Mayo held that an “inventive concept” is 
necessary to transform a fundamental principle into a patent-
eligible application.48 And while the Court’s subsequent opinion in 
Myriad made no reference to the “inventive concept” analytical 
framework, Alice affirmed that the two-stage inquiry suggested by 
Mayo is the framework for patent-eligibility under § 101: first, 
determine whether a claim is directed to a fundamental principle; 
second, if a claim is directed to an ineligible principle, ask whether 
the claim contains an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform 
the underlying principle into a patent-eligible application.49 This 
Part argues that this two-stage inquiry should be the starting point 
for a pragmatic reconstruction of the test for subject-matter 
eligibility. 
A. Mayo’s Two-Step Test: An Unrecognized Opportunity 
Progress at this point requires some way to cut the Gordian 
knot of the Supreme Court’s tangled pronouncements from Benson 
to Alice. There is one way, short of Congressional action, that the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence could be circumvented. Assuming 
that the Court’s subject-matter jurisprudence represents an 
interpretation of § 101, rather than a constitutional limitation on 
the patent power,50 then an assertion of Chevron authority by the 
USPTO could force the courts to defer to the Office’s 
interpretation of § 101.51 That outcome is unlikely. The Federal 
                                                
46 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 
(2012). 
47 Id. at 1293–94. 
48 Id. at 1294. 
49 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
50 The Court has never addressed this question definitively. 
51 See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984) (according deference to agency statutory interpretations); John 
M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
1041, 1054–1111 (2011) (arguing for USPTO authority over subject-matter 
eligibility).  
JUNE 2015] Abstractions 659 
Circuit, at least, has held that the Office is not entitled to Chevron 
deference with respect to “substantive” requirements of the patent 
statutes such as § 101,52 and the Office’s subject-matter eligibility 
guidelines aim to incorporate all of the Court’s pre-Alice case law, 
as well as much of the Federal Circuit’s.53  
But there is another way. If there is one thing we know with 
certainty about patent-eligible subject matter, it is this: Mayo’s 
two-step analysis provides the framework for all § 101 
determinations (except, in light of Myriad, claims to naturally 
occurring products). The significance of Alice’s reaffirmation of 
the Mayo two-step test has not yet been recognized. Namely, that 
the Court has endorsed a framework for patent-eligibility quite 
different from the frameworks suggested in its earlier cases. The 
enunciation of a new test in Mayo and Alice therefore provides a 
principled rationale to discount the analysis and holdings of the 
Court’s previous opinions, particularly Benson, Flook, and Diehr. 
An analogy may be helpful. Suppose this were an ordinary 
question of constitutional law. In Friedman v. Rogers,54 decided in 
1979, the Supreme Court decided that a State could, consistent 
with the First Amendment, prohibit optometrical practices from 
operating under a trade name.55 In the Court’s view, the State had 
legitimate interests in ensuring that a practice’s name corresponded 
to that of the optometrists personally practicing there;56 this interest 
                                                
52 See Golden, supra note 45, at 1045–55 (describing the lack of USPTO 
substantive rulemaking power); Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that USPTO has authority only to promulgate 
“procedural” rules); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (denying that the USPTO is entitled to deference in interpretation of 
patentability statutes). 
53 See generally, 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 
supra note 41 (attempting to reconcile current and historical precedent). 
54 440 U.S. 1 (1979). 
55 See id. at 16. 
56 The Court noted that “the public may be attracted by a trade name that 
reflects the reputation of an optometrist no longer associated with the practice,” 
that the trade names might give the illusion of competition between commonly 
owned practices, and that a State might wish to discourage the formation of 
“large-scale commercial practices with numerous branch offices” by making it 
impossible to advertise the franchise under a common name. See id. at 13. 
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outweighed the limited commercial information conveyed to a 
consumer by a trade name. That is not how the case would be 
analyzed today. One year later, the Court adopted a four-factor test 
for regulation of commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.57 In the 
Central Hudson framework, speech must be actually misleading 
before the government may prohibit it entirely;58 further, Central 
Hudson’s framework does not simply balance the government 
interest against the information content of the speech. Given that 
Friedman’s analytical framework has been superseded by the 
Central Hudson four-factor test, a court evaluating a restriction on 
trade names today might well disregard Friedman’s holding and its 
analysis as well.59 
The same might be said about patent-eligible subject matter. 
The two-part test articulated in Mayo and reaffirmed in Alice was 
not the test employed by the Court in its pre-Mayo decisions.60 Nor 
was the “building-block” focus of Mayo and Alice the exclusive or 
even primary rationale underlying the doctrine in the Court’s 
earlier cases.61 While not quite a clean slate, Mayo’s introduction 
                                                
57 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
58 See id. at 563–64. 
59 See Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 89 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Friedman’s 
applicability and continued viability is not as clear as the Commonwealth would 
have us believe because the Court subsequently adopted a more detailed test for 
limitations on commercial speech in Central Hudson.”); Alexander v. Cahill, 
598 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2010) (“There is doubt as to Friedman’s continued 
vitality. Friedman . . . did not employ Central Hudson’s multi-factor First 
Amendment analysis.”); Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting refinement of test subsequent to Friedman). 
The Circuit Courts have reached this conclusion despite the fact that Central 
Hudson embraced Friedman, characterizing it as a case about misleading 
speech. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (citing Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13, 
15–16). 
60 Flook held that an “inventive concept” was necessary to transform a 
mathematical algorithm into a patent-eligible application. Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 594 (1977). However the Flook Court did not explain the meaning of 
“inventive concept,” because it did not find any content in the contested claims 
beyond mathematical calculations. See id. at 594–95. Flook’s analytical device 
of treating the underlying principle as “a familiar part of the prior art,” id. at 
592, does not appear in Mayo or Alice.  
61 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Benson did invoke the rationale 
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of a new two-step analysis in Alice may relieve us of the obligation 
to squeeze the doctrine of patent-eligibility through each and every 
contortion of the Court’s subject-matter jurisprudence over the last 
forty years. 
B. Pragmatic Constraints on a Jurisprudence of Patent-Eligible 
Subject Matter 
Accordingly, this Article takes a pragmatic approach based on 
the foundation of Mayo’s two-step test. Though the notion of an 
“inventive concept” was founded on a profound misreading of 
historical precedent, 62  the Alice Court reaffirmed that Mayo’s 
search for an “inventive concept” is the structure of the patent-
eligibility inquiry.63 Mayo’s two-step analysis therefore represents 
an absolute constraint on a pragmatic theory of subject-matter 
eligibility. To that absolute constraint we may add a desirable one: 
a theory of subject-matter eligibility should be sensitive to the role 
of the judicial branch in administering the patent statutes. The 
Court has never definitively explained the root of its subject-matter 
jurisprudence. If it represents a Constitutional limitation on the 
exercise of Congress’s power under the Patent and Copyright 
Clause, or a free-floating judicial doctrine (such as inequitable 
conduct or the doctrine of equivalents), then there are few 
constraints on courts’ leeway to shape the doctrine. But if the 
patent-eligible subject matter doctrine represents an interpretation 
of the text of § 101, then the primary judicial role is to interpret the 
language “invents or discovers” in § 101 and the corresponding 
language “invention or discovery” in § 100.64 
                                                                                                         
that fundamental principles “are the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work,” but as only one of several justifications for holding the claims ineligible. 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
62 See Lefstin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 21–22, 24, 27–28). 
63 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
64 In addition, the Court seems to have rooted the exclusion of naturally 
occurring substances in the word “new” appearing in § 101. See Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2017, 2116 (2013) 
(differentiating between “naturally occurring phenomena” and a “‘new and 
useful . . . composition of matter’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101). The Federal 
Circuit has further excluded entities such as a transient signal or data structure 
that does not qualify as a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
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The latter constraint, while seemingly obvious, excludes 
certain theories of subject-matter eligibility. Some of the most 
cogent arguments for subject-matter exclusions are that certain 
spheres of human activity should be free of worry over patent 
infringement.65 However, it is not always possible to frame such 
exclusions in terms of “invention or discovery.” Moreover, 
Congress is better suited to craft tailored exceptions to the patent 
system—as it has done for tax strategy patents and medical 
practitioners.66 Other theories of patent-eligibility have proposed 
individualized inquiries into whether a patent on a particular 
invention would fulfill the quid pro quo of the patent system and 
promote innovation in a particular technological environment.67 
But it is difficult to rationalize such an inquiry as a judicial 
interpretation of the language of §§ 100 and 101. Even if that kind 
of individualized inquiry fills a gap left by the primary scope 
doctrines—nonobviousness, enablement, and written description—
we might question whether Congress has authorized the judiciary 
to determine whether something that is an “invention or discovery” 
under § 101 and meets the statutory requirements set forth in 
§§ 103 and 112, may nonetheless be excluded from patentability 
because such a patent might retard innovation.  
 Taking the existence of the Mayo two-step framework as the 
only absolute certainty in the subject-matter eligibility inquiry, this 
Article’s analysis begins with Mayo step two: the nature of an 
                                                                                                         
matter.” See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (transient 
signal); Digitech Image Techs. v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (data structure). 
65 See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. 
REV. 1139, 1175–76 (1999) (discussing effects of patents implicating 
professional services); see also Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of 
Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1858, 1873–85 (2014) 
(discussing moral values underlying patent-eligible subject matter debates). 
66 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 14, 125 Stat. 
284, 327–28 (2011) (deeming tax strategies to be prior art for purposes of 
novelty and non-obviousness); 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012) (restricting remedies 
against medical practitioners engaged in medical or surgical procedures). 
67 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 
1341 (2011) (proposing a five-factor scope determination to decide subject 
matter eligibility). 
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“inventive concept.” It might seem more intuitive to begin with 
Mayo step one, by defining abstract ideas, laws of nature, and 
natural phenomena. However, if we desire to begin with what we 
know with the most certainty, we should begin with Mayo step 
two. As discussed below, Mayo suggests three distinct notions for 
the nature of “inventive concept.” Defining step two therefore 
requires only a choice between three relatively well-developed 
candidates for “inventive concept.” Moreover, beginning with step 
two requires fewer assumptions about the nature of excluded 
subject matter. Since Benson, the Supreme Court has consistently 
declined to specify what it means by “abstract ideas,” “laws of 
nature,” and “natural phenomena.” Beginning with a definition of 
fundamental principles therefore entails significant ideological and 
ontological commitments to the nature of the patent-eligibility 
doctrine at the outset. The next Part therefore examines each of the 
three notions of an “inventive concept” suggested by Mayo, at least 
with respect to accepted paradigm cases of fundamental principles. 
If we can clarify Mayo step two, then we may be able to return and 
more precisely define step one. For if the fundamental principles of 
step one are those things which may be transformed into patent-
eligible applications by the addition of an “inventive concept,” 
then understanding the nature of the mill of step two may help us 
understand the nature of the grist of step one. 
IV.  CONCEPTIONS OF “INVENTIVE CONCEPT” 
While the Court has not defined the “inventive concept” of 
Mayo step two, Mayo’s analysis presents three distinct, relatively 
well-defined possibilities for the “inventive concept” necessary to 
transform a patent-ineligible fundamental principle into a 
patent-eligible application. The first test suggested by Mayo is a 
test of preemption in fact: claims involving laws of nature or other 
fundamental principles that are “overly broad” 68  and “do not 
confine their reach to particular applications of those laws”69 are 
not patent-eligible. Thus, we might ask whether a particular claim 
                                                
68 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 
(2012). 
69 Id. at 1302. 
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practically preempts all applications of an underlying law of 
nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea. Second, Mayo 
suggests a test of inventive, or non-obvious application: steps that 
represent “well-understood, routine, conventional activity 
previously engaged in by scientists in the field”70 do not suffice to 
transform a law of nature into a patent-eligible application. We 
might therefore ask whether the patentee’s application of a 
fundamental principle was “inventive,” or merely an obvious 
implementation of the underlying principle. Finally, Mayo 
repeatedly emphasizes that, in order to transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patent-eligible application, a claim “must do more 
than simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply 
it.’”71 If this is the test for Mayo step two, then a claim must be 
something more than a generic application: it must be more than a 
disclosure of a fundamental principle, coupled with a generic 
instruction to apply the law. 
All three of these notions have been adopted for Mayo step two 
in various opinions of the Federal Circuit and the district courts 
since Mayo and Alice, though the courts have seldom recognized 
that they represent distinct choices on how to interpret the Mayo 
test. This Part evaluates the three possibilities for inventive concept 
in light of historical practice and policy considerations.  
A. Preemptive Application 
Preemption as the inquiry for Mayo step two was emphasized 
by the Federal Circuit when it heard CLS Bank en banc. Both 
major factions of the Federal Circuit in CLS Bank relied on 
preemption as the basis of their analysis. For Judge Lourie, a 
patent-eligible claim must include limitations that prevent the 
claim from covering “every practical application” of a fundamental 
concept;72 Judge Rader framed the test in identical terms.73  
                                                
70 Id. at 1291. 
71 Id. at 1294. 
72 CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 
2013), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); see also id. at 1287 (holding claims invalid 
because they would pre-empt use of method in all fields).  
73 Id. at 1300. (“It is not the breadth or narrowness of the abstract idea that is 
relevant but whether the claim covers every practical application of that abstract 
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However, of the notions of “inventive concept” set forth in 
Mayo, preemption in fact is the least consonant with historical 
practice. Perhaps we ought not to care about historical practice, 
especially if we desire to write on a clean slate. But the Supreme 
Court clearly does. The Court regards the nineteenth-century 
English hot-blast cases, and its own nineteenth-century decisions 
such as O’Reilly v. Morse, 74  as the fountainhead of the 
patent-eligibility doctrine. And of all the rationales the Court has 
invoked for excluding fundamental principles, the most consistent 
one is that the Court has been so doing for over 150 years.75 
Those nineteenth-century foundational cases clearly rejected 
the view that a patent could not effectively preempt all practical 
applications of a “principle,” such as a newly discovered law of 
nature. In England, the famous hot-blast cases stood for the 
doctrine that a patent might preempt all uses of a newly discovered 
principle, provided that the patentee’s disclosure was sufficient to 
enable application of the principle beyond his particular means.76 
That was the consistent understanding in the United States as well. 
American courts always acknowledged the unpatentability of 
natural principles in the abstract, but assuming the patentee to have 
disclosed a means of application, did not inquire whether the 
patent would effectively preempt all uses of a natural law.77 
                                                                                                         
idea.”). 
74 56 U.S. 62 (1854). 
75 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) 
(“We have interpreted § 101 and its predecessors in light of this exception [of 
fundamental principles] for more than 150 years.”); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289, 
1293 (citing nineteenth century English and American cases); Bilski v. Kappos, 
561 U.S. 593, 602 (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853)). 
76 “Is it . . . an objection to the patent, that, in its application of a new principle 
to a certain specified result, it includes every variety of mode of applying the 
principle according to the general statement of the object and benefit to be 
obtained?” Househill Coal & Iron Co. v. Neilson, 1 Webster’s Patent Cases 673, 
684 (Sess. 1844). According to Hope, such generality “is no objection whatever 
to the patent.” Id. See also Jupe v. Pratt, 1 Webster’s Patent Cases 145, 146 
(Exch. Ch. 1837) (Alderson, B.) (holding that patentee who has discovered 
principle, and mode of carrying principle into effect, was entitled to protect “all 
other modes of carrying the same principle into effect”).  
77 See, e.g., Detmold v. Reeves, 7 F. Cas. 547, 549–50 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) 
(“And if [the patentee] had, besides this [i.e., disclosing his discovery], devised 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Morse was not to the 
contrary. The Court’s rejection of Morse’s infamous eighth claim 
was based, not on the objection that Morse was attempting to 
preempt the use of electromagnetism, but on the objection that 
Morse had not enabled the use of electromagnetism for 
communication independent of his particular machinery. 78  The 
argument that Morse forbade practical preemption of a force of 
nature was raised, and squarely rejected, by the Supreme Court in 
1888 in The Telephone Cases.79 As noted by Professor Sarnoff,80 
contrary to Justice Douglas’s assertion in Benson—where he 
suggested that Bell’s claims were sustained because they did not 
reach “all telephonic use of electricity” 81 —the Court in The 
Telephone Cases was quite clear: even if Bell’s claims effectively 
preempted all use of electricity for telephonic communication, that 
was not a reason to deny his claims.82 
The learned authorities of the mid- and late-nineteenth century 
were in accord, both before and after The Telephone Cases. As 
Robinson’s treatise explained: 
While it is true that no physical law or fact, merely as such, can be 
exclusively appropriated by any person, even with the aid of the patent 
privilege, yet if there be but one method by which that law or fact can 
be practically applied to useful purposes, the person who discovers and 
patents that one method thereby obtains complete control over the uses 
                                                                                                         
some form of structure, some material arrangement by which his discovery 
might be applied to use, I would be most reluctant to say that his patent, 
properly drawn out, should be limited to the mere mechanical illustration, and 
could not cover effectually the whole ground of his discovery.”). 
78 See Lefstin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 31–33). 
79 126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
80 See Sarnoff, supra note 37, at 74–75 (discussing The Telephone Cases). 
81 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972). 
82 The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 535 (“We see nothing in Morse's case to 
defeat Bell's claim; on the contrary, it is in all respects sustained by that 
authority. It may be that electricity cannot be used at all for the transmission of 
speech except in the way Bell has discovered, and that therefore, practically, his 
patent gives him its exclusive use for that purpose; but that does not make his 
claim one for the use of electricity distinct from the particular process with 
which it is connected in his patent. It will, if true, show more clearly the great 
importance of his discovery, but it will not invalidate his patent.”). 
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of such fact or law.83 
Other nineteenth-century authors agreed that while inventors 
could not patent principles in the abstract, their patents could very 
well preempt every practical application of a fundamental 
principle.84 Discussion of preemption was similarly absent in the 
early twentieth-century case law. 85  It was not until Justice 
Douglas’s opinion in Benson that “pre-emption” emerged as a 
distinct consideration in the subject matter inquiry.86 
Regardless of historical antecedents, Mayo—while justifying 
subject matter exclusions on grounds of preemption—suggests that 
policy concerns over preemption are analytically secondary to the 
test of exclusion. The Mayo Court declined to assess whether the 
patent in suit would actually preempt further innovation in the 
field, describing the possibility that the patent would “tie up too 
much future use of laws of nature” as an “underlying” concern, one 
that simply “reinforce[d]” the conclusion of patent-ineligibility.87 
Likewise, the Court regarded the prohibition against patenting 
fundamental principles as “a somewhat more easily administered 
proxy” for the underlying policy concerns.88 Thus, while Mayo 
grounded subject-matter exclusions in concerns over undue 
                                                
83 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 44 
(1890) 
84 See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR 
USEFUL INVENTIONS 422 (4th ed. 1873) (explaining that, where patentee has 
invented a mode of carrying into effect a “law of natural science,” all other 
applications of principle will infringe); HENRY CHILDS MERWIN, THE 
PATENTABILITY OF INVENTIONS 530 (1883) (“[I]f, in other words, it is 
impossible to apply the principle without using the gist of the process patented, 
then the patent practically covers every application of the principle.”). 
85 See Lefstin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 45–59). 
86 The Solicitor’s brief in Benson framed the case as a “mental process[]” 
case, and led with the argument that only a “pragmatic application” of an idea 
was patent eligible. Brief for the Petitioner at *17–18, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (No. 71-485), 1972 WL 137527. However, the Solicitor 
suggested, based on Morse, that only claims confined to “the application of the 
method to a specified field of technology” and “a particular type of apparatus or 
hardware” were patent eligible. See id. at *23–24.  
87 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 
(2012). 
88 Id. at 1303. 
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preemption, the Court’s analysis indicates that preemption itself 
should not be the focus of step two. 
The Court likely de-emphasized preemption because it foresaw 
that a test of preemption in fact would often be only a minor 
obstacle to patenting a principle. If Mayo step two permitted 
patenting of any non-preemptive application, then limiting a claim 
to a particular application of a principle would transform the claim 
into a patent-eligible application. That position was denied in 
Bilski’s gloss on Flook, where the Court held that limiting a claim 
to a particular technological environment or to one field of use 
could not by itself render an abstract idea patent-eligible.89 And 
indeed, for those post-Alice courts that have adopted a test of 
preemptive application, that contradiction has forced them to 
abandon preemption as a test when the patentee argues for the 
patent-eligibility of narrower dependent claims.  
For example, the district court in Money Suite v. 21st Century 
Insurance90 defined Mayo step two as a preemption analysis91 and 
denied that novelty of implementation was relevant to the § 101 
analysis. 92  But when the patentee argued that some of the 
dependent claims were valid because they imposed particular 
limitations on the implementation of the underlying idea, the court 
rejected the attempt on the grounds that the narrowing limitations 
were “conventional” and not “inventive.”93 In the end, the Money 
Suite court was forced to conclude that “ideas that do not preempt 
an entire field” could nonetheless fail a test of preemption.94 Other 
courts focusing on preemption have concluded that if an idea can 
be applied only in one field, such as network technology, then a 
patent claiming that idea by definition preempts all practical 
applications of that idea.95 Such logic leads to the anomalous result 
                                                
89 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–13 (2010) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 585–94 (1977); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–93 (1980)).  
90 No. 13-984-GMS, 2015 WL 436160 (D. Del. Jan. 27, 2015). 
91 Id. at *4. 
92 Id. at *3. 
93 Id. at *4. 
94 Id. at *5. 
95 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., No. 1:10cv910 (LMB/TRJ), 
2014 WL 5430956 at *4–6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2014). 
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that the more narrowly defined an abstract idea is, the more likely 
a claim to its application will be preemptive and therefore patent-
ineligible. 
Preemption in fact is therefore not a viable candidate for the 
role of inventive concept. Besides lacking historical foundation, it 
runs afoul of the Court’s repeated admonitions that mere 
narrowness of application cannot confer patent-eligibility on a 
claim. And even if we ignore those admonitions, it would seem 
difficult to distinguish “undue” preemption from the “ordinary” 
preemption of the public use of inventions accepted as the social 
cost of the patent system. 
B. Inventive Application 
The second notion of “inventive concept” articulated in Mayo 
is that of inventive, or non-obvious application. If the underlying 
concern of subject matter exclusions is that patents covering 
fundamental principles could foreclose more innovation than they 
promote,96 then a test of inventive application seems a roundabout 
way of guarding against undue preemption. Justice Breyer’s 
opinion nonetheless links the test of inventive application to the 
concern of preemption, arguing that a requirement for “something 
else” beyond the conventional and obvious will preclude claims 
from practically monopolizing a fundamental principle.97 But there 
is no necessary connection between the two: an application that is 
inventive might nonetheless be the only practical way to apply a 
new discovery. Conversely, there will always be innumerable 
modes of appending conventional and obvious activity that have 
virtually no preemptive effect. 
 Inventive application has a slightly more credible historical 
pedigree than preemption, but not by much. Mayo drew the notion 
of inventive application directly from Flook, where Justice Stevens 
originated the very notion of “inventive concept.” Justice Stevens 
                                                
96 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1293, 1301–02 (2012) (arguing that subject matter exclusion serves utilitarian 
ends).  
97  See, e.g., id. at 1299 (explaining that in Diehr, non-obvious or 
unconventional steps in a claim meant that the patentee did not seek to preempt 
all use of the Arrhenius equation). 
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observed, “Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical 
formula may be well known, an inventive application of the 
principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a 
phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other 
inventive concept in its application.”98 
Flook, however, founded the idea of inventive application in 
part on a severe misunderstanding of the hot-blast cases. Contrary 
to Justice Stevens’s assertion in Flook, neither English nor 
American patent law had endorsed a test of inventive application 
for discoveries prior to 1948.99 For it was then, in Justice Douglas’s 
opinion in Funk, that the Court held, in the context of a claim to a 
composition of matter, that the discovery of a natural phenomenon 
could not support a patent unless there was “invention” in the 
means by which the patentee applied that discovery to practical 
use. Funk represented a radical break from the course of patent law 
up to that point. Beginning with the hot-blast cases, it was black-
letter law in both the English and American systems that practical 
applications of new discoveries were patent-eligible without any 
requirement for novelty or invention in the means of application.100 
The Supreme Court’s decisions up to that point, the decisions of 
the lower courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
authoritative patent treatises, and lay descriptions of the patent 
system all made clear before Funk that a new discovery applied 
through known and conventional means was proper subject matter 
for a patent.101 
Few courts took up Funk’s holding that only inventive 
applications of fundamental principles were patent-eligible. In 
large part, this was because Funk was phrased in terms of the 
notoriously amorphous and non-statutory requirement of 
“invention.” Just four years after Funk, the 1952 Patent Act would 
replace “invention” with the seemingly more strictly defined 
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in § 101 and non-
obviousness in § 103; spanning both concepts, Funk’s doctrine was 
                                                
98 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1977). 
99 See Lefstin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 58–59). 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
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not easily classified into one or the other. And though Flook based 
its notion of an “inventive concept” on Funk, Diehr’s repudiation 
of Flook three years later ended discussion of “inventive concept” 
until its revival in Mayo.102 
However, the decisions of those courts that did follow Funk’s 
test of inventive application provide very good illustrations of why 
inventive application should not be the general standard for Mayo 
step two. Courts that took Funk at face value in the 1950s and 
1960s asked whether the claimed invention was obvious once the 
patentee’s discovery was treated as part of the prior art. 103 
Seemingly inoffensive claims such as an improved process of 
producing silica gel;104 a method of electrostatic welding;105 and the 
optimization of a process for making a lead/lead oxide 
suspension106 were all invalidated because the inventions became 
obvious once the patentee’s discovery was assumed away. In the 
pinnacle of that line of cases, Armour Pharmaceutical Co. v. 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,107 the Third Circuit invalidated a claim to 
a novel pharmaceutical composition coated to survive transit 
through the stomach. There had been no reason to make such a 
composition before the patentee unexpectedly discovered that the 
pharmaceutical in question could be absorbed by the small 
intestine. But, under Funk, the fact that the small intestine would 
absorb the drug was a phenomenon of nature; once that discovery 
was assumed away, it was not inventive to use conventional 
coatings to ensure that the drug would reach the small intestine 
intact.108 
                                                
102 The Court’s quotation of Funk in Chakrabarty, from that part of the 
opinion where Douglas noted that the patentee had not altered the structure of 
the claimed bacteria, also encouraged the mistaken perception that Funk (and 
Chakrabarty itself) were ‘product of nature’ cases. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
103 See Lefstin, supra note 8 (manuscript 71–75). 
104 Davison Chem. Corp. v. Joliet Chems., Inc., 179 F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 
1950). 
105 In re Arnold, 185 F.2d 686, 774–75 (C.C.P.A. 1950). 
106 Nat’l Lead Co. v. W. Lead Prods. Co., 324 F.2d 539, 544–46 (9th Cir. 
1963). 
107 396 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1968). 
108 Id. at 74 (“Once nature’s secret that the ileum would absorb trypsin was 
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Besides illustrating the pitfalls of inventive application as a test 
of patent-eligible subject matter, the historical record provides 
another reason to reject inventive application as the general test for 
Mayo step two. Mayo, based in part on the same mistaken 
interpretation of the hot-blast cases taken in Flook, assumed that, 
under long-standing historical practice, something beyond practical 
application had been required to render a fundamental principle 
patent-eligible. To grant protection to the diagnostic in Mayo 
would be to grant “increased protection for diagnostic laws of 
nature,” 109  which would be a departure from “general legal 
rules.”110 But the historical record teaches that, excepting Funk and 
the handful of cases applying it, American patent law has held that 
all practical applications of laws of nature were patent-eligible.111 
To impose a test of inventive application as the general 
standard of patent-eligibility would therefore represent a 
significant restriction on the scope of patent-eligible subject 
matter, as compared to the historical extent of the patent system. 
Lacking empirical data, it is difficult to say whether the historical 
scope of patent-eligible subject matter was optimal, or whether it 
should be restricted or expanded. But we can ask whether there has 
been any fundamental change in the relationship between the 
patent system and the process of technological advancement that 
would justify a departure from the historical standard of patent-
eligibility. There does not appear to be any such discontinuity, at 
least with respect to “laws of nature” and “natural phenomena.” 
Technologically, the only reason why an invention like the one in 
Mayo could not have been made in the nineteenth century is the 
incremental advances in analytical chemistry made since that time; 
there is no technological discontinuity that would suggest that the 
                                                                                                         
uncovered, any artisan would have known the process of enterically coating the 
trypsin to enable it to pass through the acidic environment of the stomach and 
continue into the ileum.”). 
109 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1305 (2012) (emphasis added). 
110 Id. 
111 Subject to the limitations imposed by the technological arts, mental steps, 
and printed matter doctrines, as well as the other statutory conditions of 
patentability. 
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boundaries of the patent system need to be redefined.112  
In summary, at least for those kinds of inventions traditionally 
within the domain of the patent system, a requirement of inventive 
application for patent-eligibility seems misplaced. Patent law 
experimented with such a standard in the wake of Funk, and the 
results were not inspiring. While discoveries in the abstract have 
always been unpatentable, absent some change in the basic 
relationship between scientific discovery and technological 
advancement, there is little reason to impose new eligibility 
restrictions on inventions arising from basic discoveries.  
C. Generic Application 
The third notion of “inventive concept” that appears in Mayo is 
the idea that a claim must represent something more than a generic 
instruction to apply a fundamental principle. In particular, Mayo 
emphasizes that one cannot transform a law of nature into a 
patent-eligible application by simply disclosing the law of nature 
and adding the words “apply it.”113 Justice Breyer explained that 
Einstein could not have patented E=mc2 by a claim that did no 
more than instruct one to refer to the equation in order to determine 
the relationship between mass and energy; nor could Archimedes 
have patented his principle of buoyant force by a claim that simply 
told boat builders to refer to that principle to determine whether an 
object will float.114 According to Justice Breyer, the claims in Mayo 
likewise represented “nothing significantly more than an 
instruction to doctors to apply the applicable laws when treating 
their patients.”115 
                                                
112 Whether diagnostic methods should be eligible for patents is another 
question; like the question of patents deriving from the human genome, if the 
patentability of diagnostic methods raises particular concerns, those concerns are 
not about the basic relationship between discovery and patentability. The 
deciphering of the human genome might be the best candidate for a 
technological discontinuity, but the concerns from genomic patents (which 
transcend the purely utilitarian) are best addressed by tailored solutions, rather 
than a redefinition of the relationship between discovery and the patent system. 
113 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294; see also id. at 1297.  
114 Id. at 1297. 
115 Id. at 1298. 
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While the themes  of preemption, inventive application, and 
generic application were all represented in Mayo, generic 
application became the predominant theme in Alice. As in Mayo, 
the Alice court identified the risk of disproportionate preemption as 
the justification for subject matter exclusions, 116  but in the 
application of Mayo step two, Justice Thomas described 
preemption as the concern that “drives” or “undergirds” the 
Court’s § 101 jurisprudence, rather than the operational test.117 
With respect to inventive application, Alice did disparage the 
patentee’s computer implementation as “‘well-understood, routine, 
conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry,”118 but 
the word obvious is conspicuously absent from Alice. Also absent 
from Alice is Mayo’s confession that the subject-matter and 
novelty inquiries of §§ 101 and 102 might sometimes overlap.119 
The de-emphasis of preemption and inventive application in 
Alice extends to its characterization of the Court’s prior precedents. 
In Mayo, the Court presented Benson as standing for the 
prohibition against claims “that too broadly preempt the use of a 
natural law.”120 In Alice, however, the Court treated Benson as 
standing for the doctrine that merely implementing a mathematical 
principle on a physical machine is insufficient to transform the 
principle into a patent-eligible application. 121  In Mayo, Flook 
provided the doctrine that purely “conventional or obvious” 
activity cannot transform a principle into an eligible application.122 
In Alice, while the Court describes the implementation in Flook as 
“purely conventional” (but not obvious), the Court uses Flook 
instead for the proposition that limiting a claim to a particular 
technological environment cannot circumvent the prohibition 
                                                
116 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2344–45 (2014). 
117 Id. at 2354, 2358. 
118 Id. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). 
119  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (“We recognize that, in evaluating the 
significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the 
§ 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.”). 
120 Id. at 1294 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)). 
121 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. 
122 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298–99. 
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against patenting abstract ideas.123 
The emphasis on generic application is most apparent in 
Alice’s application of step two. Though Justice Thomas does label 
the implementation “routine” and “conventional,” the emphasis is 
not on preemptive application or inventive application, but generic 
application. The Court described its holding in short: 
We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of 
intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer 
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a 
patent-eligible invention.124 
And summarizing the Court’s precedent: 
These cases demonstrate that the mere recitation of a generic computer 
cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible 
invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” 
is not enough for patent eligibility.’125 
And, as for the application of step two: 
The claims at issue amount to “nothing significantly more” than an 
instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using 
some unspecified, generic computer.126 
A standard of generic application, rather than preemptive application 
or inventive application, is clearly the dominant theme in Alice. 
As a candidate for step two, generic application seems closest 
to the historical boundary line between abstract ideas and practical 
application. The demands of both English and American courts, 
that the patentee disclose particular means by which a new 
principle could be applied, seem not very far removed from the 
                                                
123 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. 
124 Id. at 2352 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that “the method 
claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to 
transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. at 2357. 
125 Id. at 2358 (emphasis added) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). 
126 Id. at 2360 (emphasis added) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298); see also 
id. at 2359 (“In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to 
perform generic computer functions.”); id. at 2359 (“Viewed as a whole, 
petitioner's method claims simply recite the concept of intermediated settlement 
as performed by a generic computer.”); id. at 2360 (“The method claims recite 
the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a 
handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same 
idea.”). 
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demand in Mayo and Alice that the patentee do more than state a 
principle and append the words “apply it.” 
We could, if we were so inclined, even understand Funk as a 
generic application case. In Funk, the patentee had merely 
discovered that non-inhibitive bacteria existed. Bond’s 
specification made clear that he had not discovered what was 
behind the phenomenon of non-inhibition, nor any way, short of 
combination itself, to identify compatible bacteria. 127  Yet his 
claims embraced all compatible bacteria, whether known or 
unknown; the patentee claimed essentially all bacterial inoculants 
in which the bacteria were compatible.128 
One way of looking at Funk is that the patentee merely 
disclosed an abstract natural phenomenon—the existence of 
compatible strains—and attempted to claim the generic application 
of such discovery. This seems to be what Justice Frankfurter had in 
mind when he distinguished between a particular combination of 
compatible strains, which he regarded as patentable, and Bond’s 
claim, which was based solely on “the idea that there might be 
mutually compatible strains.” 129  Thus, while Justice Douglas’s 
opinion faulted the non-inventiveness of Bond’s application, 
Justice Frankfurter arguably concluded that Bond’s claim 
represented nothing more than a statement of a natural 
                                                
127 The patent specification in Funk stated: 
The organisms of the genus Rhizobium which are mutually 
noninhibitive may be designated by the term alpha. No method has 
been observed whereby the alpha strains of the organisms may be 
differentiated from the mutually inhibitive group of Rhizobia other 
than by making actual nitrogen fixation tests by inoculating the various 
plant hosts with the proposed mixture of the Rhizobia. 
 U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532 p. 5 col. 1 ll. 36–44 (filed Aug. 24, 1938). 
128 The patent claimed, inter alia: 
An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected 
mutually non-inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the 
genus Rhizobium, the bacteria of each strain being present in numbers 
of substantially the same order of magnitude, said strains being 
unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the 
leguminous plant for which they are specific. 
Id. p. 7 col. 1 ll. 39–45 (claim 4). 
129 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 337 U.S. 127, 133 (1948) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring).  
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phenomenon coupled with the instruction to “apply it.” 
The third test suggested by Mayo is therefore a test of 
non-generic application. To be patent-eligible, a claim must do 
more than set forth a fundamental principle and add the direction 
‘apply it;’ something more than steps “specified at a high level of 
generality”130 is necessary for an inventive concept.131 
V.  A DIFFERENTIATED FRAMEWORK FOR MAYO STEP TWO 
Based on historical antecedents and the Supreme Court’s 
distinct turn in Alice, it might seem that generic application should 
henceforth be the test dividing fundamental principles from 
patent-eligible applications. But there are reasons to hesitate before 
reaching that conclusion. For one thing, focusing entirely on 
generic application requires us to regard the Court’s use of 
“inventive,” “well-understood,” “routine,” “obvious,” “already in 
use,” and the like in its § 101 jurisprudence as mere surplus 
verbiage. We may be willing to jettison such language if we think 
that Alice rejected Flook and Mayo’s injection of “inventiveness” 
into the § 101 inquiry (though, as usual, paying lip service to the 
Court’s fiction that its precedents are consistent). However, this 
Part argues for a theory of inventive concept that embraces both 
inventive application and non-generic application. Namely, it 
argues that the test of inventive concept should be differentiated 
depending on the extent to which the invention in question 
embodies a discovery. 
A. Is a Single Test of Inventive Concept Necessary? 
Particularly since Bilski, the Court’s opinions have been 
written as if a single principle governs exclusions from the patent 
system: the exclusion of abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural 
phenomena. Yet while the Court has suggested a unitary doctrine, 
there is no a priori reason to assume that the same concerns lie 
behind the exclusion of the very different kinds of fundamental 
                                                
130 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1300 (2012). 
131 Generic applications will often, but not necessarily always, be preemptive 
as well. See infra Part V.C (proposing a standard for non-generic application). 
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principles that have been considered in its opinions: 
thermodynamic or pharmacokinetic relationships;132 principles for 
organizing human economic activity, such as hedging or trusted 
intermediaries;133 and largely mathematical constructs.134 In very 
broad strokes, a concern over “undue preemption” might lie behind 
each of these exclusions. But the potential differences in the social 
costs and benefits of patent protection for each category suggests 
that different categories require different implementations of the 
subject-matter exclusion doctrine. In other words, if the similarity 
between the categories of excluded subject matter can be defined 
only in very general terms, there is no reason to demand that the 
detailed implementation of exclusion be similar across the 
excluded categories. 
In effect, the Court has already admitted as much. In Benson, 
Justice Douglas indicated that the same principles governed the 
patent-eligibility of compositions of matter and processes.135 Yet, 
in Myriad, where the Court considered the patent-eligibility of 
claims to DNA molecules derived from human genomic DNA and 
mRNA, the Court made no reference to any “inventive concept” or 
Mayo’s two-step framework. While Justice Thomas did describe 
the isolation and purification of human gene sequences as “not an 
act of invention,” 136  his opinion rests on the conclusion that 
isolated gene sequences are not new compositions of matter, as 
recited in § 101. 137  Likewise, in concluding that cDNAs 138 are 
patent-eligible, Thomas does so, not because they embody an 
“inventive concept” beyond the natural phenomenon—a test which 
                                                
132 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1980); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289. 
133 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS 
Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
134 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584 (1977). 
135 Benson, 409 U.S. at 67–68. 
136 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2017, 
2117 (2013). 
137 Id.  
138  cDNAs are laboratory-created DNA copies of naturally occurring 
messenger RNA molecules, carrying the protein-coding information of human 
genes. See id. at 2112. 
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would almost certainly have rendered them patent-ineligible139—
but because cDNA does not exist in nature.140 So, while the Court 
rationalized its decision with Mayo’s “building-block” concern,141 
the Court’s test for exclusion of products derived from natural 
sources does not invoke Mayo’s notion of “inventive concept.” 
B. Kinds of Abstractions: Observational and Non-Observational 
Inventions 
Before examining how a differentiated Mayo step two might 
operate, it is necessary to define at least a preliminary ontology of 
those entities that might be classified as fundamental principles in 
Mayo step one. Given that concrete natural phenomena, such as 
naturally occurring substances, are, per Myriad, not the subjects of 
the Mayo framework, I define the domain of the Mayo/Alice test as 
abstractions in general, including what are commonly termed 
“laws of nature” and “abstract ideas.” 
Of course, all claims are abstractions in some sense of the 
word; that is, a claim defines a set (or other type of category142) of 
possible objects or processes sharing the properties enumerated by 
the claim, rather than a particular physical instantiation of an 
object or process. But, obviously, that cannot be what we mean 
when we exclude abstractions from patent-eligibility. Rather, given 
that the purpose of Mayo step two is to identify patent-eligible 
applications of fundamental principles, the subjects of Mayo step 
one are those things which themselves cannot be applications. 
They are abstractions in the older patent law sense of the word: an 
idea or principle behind the claimed invention, which represents a 
practical application of that idea. 
                                                
139 There was no contention in the case that the act of copying naturally 
occurring RNA into synthetic cDNA was “inventive” at the time the inventions 
were made; such operations were routine and conventional at the time. Id. 
140 See id. at 2119 (“[T]he lab technician unquestionably creates something 
new when cDNA is made.”). 
141 Id. at 2116. 
142 See Andrew Chin, The Ontological Function of the Patent Document, 74 
U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 304 (2012) (regarding claims as mereological sums or 
fusions of their embodiments). 
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Without attempting to rigorously define abstractions, 143  we 
might begin by identifying two basic categories of abstractions. 
First, there is static information, including both facts about the 
natural world discovered by observation and invariant patterns and 
processes generated by humans. Second, there are decision-making 
processes, encompassing both those based on relationships 
discovered by observation and those not based on discovery from 
observation. The distinction between static information and 
decision-making processes is for illustrative purposes only, and has 
no doctrinal significance. For the theory articulated in this Article, 
the operative distinction is the further distinction drawn in each 
category: between those facts and decision-making processes 
discovered by observation—particularly observation of the natural 
world—and those facts or decision-making processes that are not 
the product of observation. Observation-based principles, generally 
corresponding to the conventional “laws of nature,” should be 
subject to a test of non-generic application for patent-eligibility. 
Principles not based on observation, generally corresponding to 
conventional “abstract ideas,” should be subject to a test of inventive 
application. 
The rationale for such a distinction comes from a view of the 
patent system articulated by Professor Merges: the patent system 
should ideally function to incentivize inventions whose 
development entails significant uncertainty and risk.144 The critical 
insight is that research and development leading to potentially 
patentable inventions is often conducted under conditions where 
the innovator does not know whether a commercially successful 
product will result.145 Premised on the notion that the grant of 
patents should be restricted to those inventions whose development 
would not be undertaken without the rewards provided by a patent, 
Merges concluded that the social benefits of the patent system are 
greatest when patents are withheld for “research with a high 
                                                
143 For an exploration of the potential meanings of “abstract idea,” see Kevin 
Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable Abstract Idea.” 
15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011). 
144 Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 1 (1992). 
145 See id. at 23.  
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probability of promising results.” 146  From modeling of the 
decision-making process followed by inventors, Merges argued 
that the level of uncertainty faced by the inventor—in particular, 
the uncertainty at the time just prior to the final experiment that 
leads to the development of a patentable invention—should be the 
key factor in the system’s decision whether or not to award a 
patent.147 
Merges’s argument is that the uncertainty and risk associated 
with development should be the basic principle guiding the test of 
non-obviousness under § 103: because of the social cost of patent 
monopolies, § 103 should operate to restrict patents where 
commercial development is not associated with uncertainty and 
risk.148 In a world where concerns over the social cost of patents are 
solely the domain of § 103 (and § 112),149 such arguments might 
have no place in § 101. We are not in that world, however. The 
Supreme Court in Mayo grounded subject matter exclusions in 
utilitarian concerns over the social cost of patents, and overruled 
sub silentio Diehr’s warning against admixing § 102 and § 103 
into the subject matter inquiry. Under these circumstances, 
applying Merges’s insight to the subject matter inquiry may help 
clarify the appropriate test for Mayo step two. 
The premise, therefore, of the distinction between 
observation-based inventions (especially those based on 
observations of the natural world) and those not based on 
observation is that the former are more likely to be subject to 
uncertainty and risk in development than the latter. A prototypical 
“law of nature” invention, almost by definition, is based on the 
discovery of an unknown: in Mayo, the alleged discovery of the 
relationship between 6-thioguanine levels and therapeutic 
effectiveness. In contrast, the prototypical “abstract idea” 
invention—such as the business methods in Bilski and Alice—is 
not based upon the discovery of a previously unknown principle. 
                                                
146 Id. at 29. Merges argued that probability of commercial success should not 
be a factor in this consideration. See id. at 34. 
147 See id. at 33. 
148 See id. at 29. 
149 Because § 112 determines patent scope, it also controls the social cost of 
patent monopolies. 
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C. Differentiating Inventive Application and Generic Application 
by Uncertainty in Development 
The analytical framework I propose for Mayo step two is to 
differentiate between “laws of nature”—prototypically 
discovery-based inventions—and “abstract ideas”—prototypically 
not discovery-based inventions. A test of generic application should 
be required for “laws of nature,” while an inventive application 
should be required for “abstract ideas.” This framework assumes 
that inventive applications represent a subset of non-generic 
applications: 
 
Figure 1 – Inventive Applications as a Subset of Non-Generic Applications 
That is, in a claim consisting of nothing more than a statement of a 
fundamental principle coupled with a generic instruction to apply 
the principle, the instruction “apply it” cannot be inventive. 
However, there are many applications which are non-generic but 
not inventive; a claim might state a fundamental principle and 
further define a means of application that is specific but not 
“inventive” in the sense of Funk. 
If observation-based inventions are likely subject to risk and 
uncertainty in their development, then there is no reason to impose 
an additional requirement of non-obvious “invention” for 
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transformation into patent-eligible applications. Moreover, as 
discussed above, 150  such inventions were historically patent-
eligible, excepting Funk and the handful of cases that imposed 
Funk’s standard of inventive application in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Assuming that the patent system functioned reasonably well in the 
two centuries preceding Mayo, and assuming no fundamental 
change in the relationship between patentable discoveries and 
technological advance, there appears to be no justification for 
deviating from the historical standard of patent-eligibility. Hence, a 
standard of generic application, most similar to the historical 
standard of patent-eligibility, should govern discovery-based 
inventions.151 
In contrast, inventions not based on observation of previously 
unknown facts or relationships are unlikely to face the same 
uncertainty in the development process. Such inventions may be 
subject to commercial uncertainty—whether they would ultimately 
be desired by the market—but, as Merges argues, the case for 
patent protection is significantly less compelling for purely 
commercial uncertainties than more technological ones. 152 
Moreover, in contrast to discovery-based inventions, there are at 
least theoretical justifications for deviating from the historical 
standard of patent-eligibility for such inventions—particularly 
those involving automated decision-making processes. First, before 
the advent of modern information technology, the patent system 
never grappled with the problem of automated decision-making 
processes. Second, many such inventions (such as the financial 
methods in Bilski and Alice) were historically removed from the 
                                                
150 See supra Part IV.B. 
151 An inventor seeking the more generous treatment accorded to discovery-
based inventions should be obliged to disclose and point out the discovery in 
question in the patent specification. 
152 Merges, supra note 144, at 34. Merges based this distinction primarily on 
the value of the technological information produced and disclosed in the patent 
specification. First, he viewed technological information as more likely to yield 
positive externalities than market information. See id. Second, because of the 
value of disclosure, patents ought to reward the overcoming of technical 
uncertainty even if the product is a commercial failure; in contrast, a system that 
rewarded the overcoming of commercial uncertainty would leave the 
commercially unsuccessful inventor with nothing. See id. at 29. 
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patent system by the non-statutory exclusion of business methods 
or “mental steps.” That such inventions were not historically 
within the patent system does not establish that they should be 
excluded under § 101. However, it does suggest that our current 
doctrines of non-obviousness and enablement might not be suited 
to regulate the patentability of such inventions, because those 
doctrines evolved for the most part in an environment lacking 
those kinds of inventions.153 
In essence, what this theory proposes is a distinction between 
discoveries and inventions in the patent-eligibility inquiry. That 
distinction is not a new idea in patent law. From 1790 to the 
present day, the patent statutes have provided that one who has 
invented or discovered one of the enumerated subject-matter 
classes is eligible to receive a patent.154 In the nineteenth century, 
the distinction had significance. In Burr v. Duryee,155 Justice Grier 
distinguished “discoveries”—“new application[s] of certain natural 
forces to produce a certain result to which they had never before 
been applied” 156 —from simple inventions, such as the “mere 
combination of certain mechanical devices to produce a desired 
manufacture in a cheaper or better manner.”157 For the category of 
discoveries, no ‘invention’ in the means of application was 
necessary; such inventions were patentable, even though “no skill 
or invention” was necessary to devise applications once the 
discovery was pointed out.158 The same distinction was the basis of 
Merwin’s 1883 treatise. As he explained, most patents were 
granted for “inventions,” which operated according to known laws 
                                                
153 Much in the same way that inhabitants of an ecosystem evolved to a state 
of equilibrium may be ill-equipped to deal with the introduction of new kinds of 
organisms. 
154 Compare Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790) 
(providing that patents should be granted to persons who “have invented or 
discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any 
improvement therein . . . .”) with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”). 
155 68 U.S. 531 (1863). 
156 Id. at 568. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 569. 
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or familiar properties of matter.159 In such cases, mere novelty 
would not suffice; patentability demanded the additional quality of 
“invention.”160 On the other hand, for “discoveries,” based on a 
newly discovered law of nature or property of matter, practical 
application was sufficient. The means of application in such cases 
might well be “devoid of all invention,” and apparent to one skilled 
in the art upon disclosure of the discovery.161 
If we are to distinguish in Mayo step two between 
observation-based “discoveries,” subject to a test of generic 
application, and non-observation based “inventions,” subject to a 
test of inventive application, how would such tests operate? In the 
case of prototypical “natural laws,” an application that merely 
reveals the underlying observation would amount to nothing more 
than an instruction to “apply it.” So, for example, a claim directed 
solely to a method of comparing the sequence of a patient’s gene to 
the sequence of the wild type gene, which the Federal Circuit 
regarded as an unpatentable mental comparison in In re BRCA1- 
and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent, 162  might be 
more accurately characterized as a claim based solely on the 
underlying natural phenomenon: the sequence of a particular 
human gene.163 In contrast, for a case like Ariosa v. Sequenom,164 
                                                
159 HENRY CHILDS MERWIN, THE PATENTABILITY OF INVENTIONS 3 (1883). 
160 See id. 
161 Id. at 4. 
162 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A representative claim, rewritten to include 
the limitations of the independent claim from which it depended, was: 
A method for screening germline of a human subject for an alteration 
of a BRCA1 gene which comprises comparing germline sequence of a 
BRCA1 gene or BRCA1 RNA from a tissue sample from said subject 
or a sequence of BRCA1 cDNA made from mRNA from said sample 
with germline sequences of wild-type BRCA1 gene, wild-type BRCA1 
RNA or wild-type BRCA1 cDNA, wherein a difference in the 
sequence of the BRCA1 gene, BRCA1 RNA or BRCA1 cDNA of the 
subject from wild-type indicates an alteration in the BRCA1 gene in 
said subject[,] wherein a germline nucleic acid sequence is compared 
by amplifying all or part of a BRCA1 gene from said sample using a 
set of primers to produce amplified nucleic acids and sequencing the 
amplified nucleic acids. 
Id. at 761. 
163 Or a relationship between a gene sequence and the incidence of breast 
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where the underlying discovery was the presence of cell-free fetal 
DNA in the maternal bloodstream, the use of such DNA to screen 
for a particular paternally-inherited genetic defect—while not 
inventive over the discovery—represents something more than 
revealing the underlying natural phenomenon: the general 
existence of cell-free fetal DNA. 165  Similarly, in the case of 
observed relationships, the claims in Mayo recited nothing more 
than the revelation of the underlying relationship, between 
6-thioguanine levels and therapeutic effectiveness. 166  A claim 
further reciting therapeutic steps—possibly, nothing more than 
adjusting the drug dosage—would constitute more than revealing 
the underlying relationship and therefore something more than a 
generic application.167  
What of inventions based on discoveries in the social sciences, 
such as human psychology, or even economics? While such 
inventions were not historically within the patent system, they 
would be patent-eligible, subject to a test of generic application, 
under the framework articulated here. Given that Bilski rejected a 
technological arts test, there appears no principled reason to limit 
discovery-based inventions to the physical or biological sciences.  
                                                                                                         
cancer; again, the distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘relationships’ is illustrative 
only. 
164 19 F. Supp. 3d 938 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
165 Similarly, in a case like Armour Pharmaceutical, where the underlying 
observation was the ability of the small intestine to absorb trypsin, an enteric-
coated trypsin formulation may have been obvious in light of the discovery, but 
is not the mere revelation of the underlying fact. 
166 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1296–98 (2012). Likewise, in a case like Genetic Veterinary Sciences, Inc. v. 
Canine EIC Genetics, LLC, No. 14–1598 (JRT/JJK), 2015 WL 1505669 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 31, 2015), the grounds of decision ought to be not that the claims 
require only well-known methods of genetic testing, but that the claims do 
nothing more than reveal the relationship between a genetic sequence and 
predilection for disease. 
167 Claims like the ones in Davison Chemical and Western Lead, where prior 
art processes were optimized based on the discovery of the relationship between 
reaction conditions and chemical state, similarly involve more than simply 
articulating the relationship between reaction state and product uniformity. By 
analogy to Mayo, a claim that did no more than direct the observation of 
reaction conditions would not be patent-eligible. 
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If the development of an invention based on social science is 
characterized by uncertainty and risk, and if the public benefits 
from the disclosure of the discovery underlying the claimed 
application, then the same rationales hold to permit non-generic 
applications of such discoveries to be the subject of patents. 
Indeed, Justice Thomas seemed to put the physical and social 
sciences on equal footing in Alice, when, rejecting the patentee’s 
argument based on the tangibility of computers, he explained that a 
standard of mere physical implementation would permit a patentee 
to “claim any principle of the physical and social sciences by 
reciting a computer system configured to implement the relevant 
concept.” 168  So long as Bilski stands for the rejection of a 
technological arts test, practical applications of discoveries in the 
social sciences should stand on the same footing as discoveries in 
the physical sciences. 
For non-observational inventions—those based on 
human-generated patterns, and processes not based on observation—
Mayo step two requires inventive application. Because inventive 
applications represent a subset of non-generic applications, any 
generic application is by definition also non-inventive. Therefore, a 
claim may be classified as non-patent-eligible in Mayo step two 
either by showing that the application represents nothing more than 
a generic instruction to “apply it” or by showing that the 
application requires nothing more than “‘well-understood, routine, 
conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.”169 Any 
claim reciting no more than generic computer implementation, or 
generic Internet implementation, clearly fails this test. 
VI.  ABSTRACT IDEAS RECONSIDERED: IS SOFTWARE ALWAYS 
AN ABSTRACTION? 
Having defined a framework for step two of the Mayo inquiry, 
let us briefly return to step one. Does the analysis of step two shed 
light on the nature of “abstract ideas”? The easy cases are those 
where a general principle of organizing human activity is coupled 
with an instruction equivalent to “do it on a computer” or “do it on 
                                                
168 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014). 
169 Id. at 2369 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). 
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the Internet.” According to Bilski and Alice, the modes of 
organizing human activity in those cases—hedging risk in the 
commodities market, or using a trusted intermediary to reduce 
settlement risk—are abstract ideas. The hard cases are those like 
California Institute of Technology v. Hughes Communication170 
(“Caltech”), which involve specific and technological information-
processing claims. 
The patents in Caltech were directed to a method of generating 
error correction codes in digital transmissions. They described a 
method of generating parity bits by accumulating previously 
generated parity bits, and a sum of randomly chosen irregular 
repeats of message bits.171 The broadest claims recited only the 
steps of receiving a message bitstream, generating parity bits 
according to a disclosed set of rules, and making the parity bits 
available for transmission.172 Under the framework described in 
this Article, the error-correction techniques disclosed in the patent 
are non-observational inventions, like the ones in Bilski and Alice, 
and therefore subject to a test of inventive application. But unlike 
Bilski or Alice, the claims define a specific information-processing 
technique, rather than a basic economic practice. That technique of 
generating and interpolating parity bits was regarded by the court 
as inventive over the prior art.173  
The pivotal question in Caltech, and perhaps for software 
patents more generally, is whether specific information-processing 
techniques are abstract ideas. If they are abstract ideas, then they 
are essentially unpatentable: if there is such a thing as an inventive 
application of a specific-information processing technique, then a 
claim to that application is likely so narrow as to be worthless. 
Certainly the claims in Caltech were not inventive applications of 
the techniques developed by the inventors. On the other hand, if 
the abstract idea in the contested claims was something more 
general than the specific technique for generating and embedding 
parity bits, then the specific technique represented an inventive, 
                                                
170 No. 2:13-cv-07245-MRP-JEM, 2014 WL 5661290 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 
2014). 
171 See id. at *2. 
172 See, e.g., U.S. Patent 7,421,032, claim 1 (filed Sept. 2, 2008). 
173 Caltech, 2014 WL 5661290 at *17. 
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and therefore patent-eligible, application of the underlying abstract 
idea. 
In Digitech Image Technologies v. Electronics for Imaging,174 the 
Federal Circuit seemingly suggested that all information-processing 
techniques are, by definition, abstract ideas. The claims in Digitech 
were directed to methods of generating “device profiles,” which 
would incorporate both color and spatial distortion properties of 
imaging equipment.175 Based on language from Flook, the Digitech 
court stated “a process that employs mathematical algorithms to 
manipulate existing information to generate additional information 
is not patent eligible.”176 Further, according to the court, if a patent 
describes “a process of organizing information through 
mathematical correlations and is not tied to a specific structure or 
machine,” then the patent claims an abstract idea.177 A literal 
reading of Digitech would therefore classify all information-
processing techniques, whether specific or general, as abstract 
ideas.  
However, in Caltech, Judge Pfaelzer of the Central District of 
California regarded such an interpretation of Digitech as 
incompatible with both the basic patentability of software and the 
Supreme Court’s sidelining of the machine-or-transformation test 
in Bilski.178 The Caltech court instead concluded that “abstract 
ideas” should be defined by looking to the purpose of the claim, 
recited “at a reasonably high level of generality.”179 Under this 
analysis, the claims in Caltech were directed to an abstract idea: 
encoding and decoding data to achieve error correction. 180 
Nonetheless, the application of that idea—the use and 
accumulation of irregularly repeated message bits as parity bits—
represented an innovative and unconventional application of the 
underlying idea.181 Hence, the asserted claims were patent-eligible. 
                                                
174 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
175 See id. at 1348–49. 
176 Id. at 1351. 
177 Id. at 1350. 
178 Caltech, 2014 WL 5661290 at *9. 
179 Id. at *13. 
180 See id. at *15. 
181 See id. at *17. This discussion focuses on the court’s treatment of the ‘032 
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In light of the turn of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in 
Mayo and Alice, the Caltech court’s analysis appears to be correct 
for two reasons. First, Mayo and Alice reoriented the doctrine of 
patent-eligible subject matter by focusing on the “building-block” 
concern as a justification for excluding abstract ideas. Mayo and 
Alice teach that abstract ideas are not characterized by 
intangibility, nor by field of invention. Rather, abstract ideas are 
characterized by “preemptiveness” or “fundamentalness:” the risk 
that a patent on the abstract idea will unduly tie up a principle 
necessary for further technological advance. Whether a process is 
physical does not correlate with the risk that effective preemption 
of that principle will unduly impede innovation.182 When Bilski and 
Alice identified abstract ideas, they were broad concepts—such as 
hedging or intermediated settlement—that were described as 
fundamental economic practices.183 In contrast, a particular method 
of generating parity bits is not a fundamental concept whose 
monopolization would pose any risk of impeding innovation 
beyond the inevitable preemption effected by any patent.184 
The second reason why the Caltech court was correct to 
                                                                                                         
patent’s claims, but the analysis was similar for the other patents in suit. See id. 
at *18–*20. 
182 There are cogent arguments that “abstract” software patents—abstract in 
the sense of having vague boundaries—pose great difficulties for the patent 
system. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: 
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATIONS AT RISK 198–
212 (2008) (describing costs of abstract patents). It may be that intangible 
processes pose more definitional problems than tangible ones. But given that the 
Supreme Court has declined to restrict patents to tangible processes, those 
concerns are properly addressed under § 112, not § 101. 
183 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014); 
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010). 
184 In Mayo, the Court stated that even a ‘narrow’ natural law with limited 
applications is still an ineligible fundamental principle. Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012). But Mayo 
should not be read to mean that specificity is irrelevant to the identification of an 
abstract idea. It seems difficult to identify “specific abstract ideas” without 
equating “abstract” to “intangible,” which would be contrary to Bilski and Alice. 
Moreover, in contrast to the limited stock of discoverable laws of nature, the 
stock of human-created ideas is potentially infinite. Hence, monopolization of a 
“narrow abstract idea” does not raise the same concerns as monopolization of a 
“narrow law of nature.” 
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identify error correction, rather than the specific method of 
computing parity bits, as the abstract idea in the claims follows 
from the structure of the Mayo/Alice test. Step one defines the 
abstraction (if any) underlying the claim, while step two asks if the 
application of that abstraction is inventive.185 The object of step 
one must therefore be to separate the idea of the invention from the 
means of application. This is hardly an unprecedented notion in 
patent law. For generations, courts deciding inventorship have 
distinguished between formulating a desired goal or result—which 
is not a contribution to conception—and formulating the means of 
attaining that result—which is a contribution to conception.186 It 
follows that the means of implementing a particular result—even if 
those means are a mathematical procedure—are applications to be 
evaluated in Mayo step two, not abstractions to be evaluated in 
Mayo step one. 
To the extent that Digitech suggests that all 
information-processing steps should be classified as abstract ideas, 
it is premised on principles that the Supreme Court itself has 
abandoned. The Digitech court based its reasoning on language 
from Flook, in which the Court—quoting from an opinion of the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals—stated that claims “directed 
essentially to a method of calculating” are not statutory subject 
matter.187 However, as the Caltech court recognized, extrapolating 
that language from Flook to hold that all information-processing 
                                                
185 Caltech, 2014 WL 5661290 at *3. Or non-generic, in the case of a 
discovery-based invention. 
186 See, e.g., Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970) 
(“One who merely suggests an idea of a result to be accomplished, rather than 
means of accomplishing it, is not a joint inventor.”); Land v. Dreyer, 155 F.2d 
383, 387 (C.C.P.A. 1946) (“It is not sufficient, therefore, to show that a party 
claiming an invention has conceived a result to be obtained; the patentable thing 
is the means provided and disclosed by him to accomplish that result.”); Bianco 
v. Globus Med., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 565, 577 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (Bryson, J., 
sitting by designation) (“A person does not become entitled to be named as a 
joint inventor on a patent merely by suggesting a desired goal or result without 
conceiving of the means by which that goal can be attained.”) (citing Garrett). 
187 Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 
1344, 1351 (2014) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978), in turn 
quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1977)). 
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claims are nonstatutory not only gives short shrift to Diehr, but 
(more significantly) is incompatible with the Court’s rejection of 
machine-or-transformation as the definitive test for patent-eligibility 
in Bilski. Mayo and Alice emphasize that the foundation of subject 
matter exclusions under § 101 is not Flook’s notion that laws of 
nature and mathematical formulas “always existed,”188 but the risk 
posed by too broadly preempting fundamental principles. With this 
reorientation of the patent-eligibility doctrine, Benson and Flook’s 
focus on “algorithms” is no longer relevant. Benson and Flook 
employed neither the rationale nor the analysis used by the 
Supreme Court in its opinions since Bilski. It is risk of preemption, 
and not tangibility or field of endeavor, that characterizes abstract 
ideas under the framework articulated by Mayo and Alice. Specific 
information-processing algorithms, such as the method of 
generating parity bits claimed in Caltech, should therefore be 
regarded as applications and not “abstract ideas” for purposes of 
Mayo step one.  
In contrast to Caltech, in McRO, Inc. v. Activision Publishing, 
Inc.,189 Judge Wu (also of the Central District of California) found 
a method of automatically animating lip synchronization and facial 
expression in digital animation to be ineligible, even though the 
court regarded computer animation as “a specific technological 
process” rather than an abstract idea.190 The McRO court adopted 
what it called a “point of novelty” approach: to evaluate eligibility 
under § 101, a court “must factor out conventional activity.”191 For 
the patents in suit, the difference between prior art synchronization 
methods and the claimed method was the use of preprogrammed 
rules, rather than the judgment of an artist, to set values 
representing the shape of an animated character’s mouth as it 
pronounces particular sounds.192 But according to the court, the 
claim recited the use of rules without specifying what those rules 
                                                
188 Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15. 
189 No. CV 14–336–GW(FFMx), 2014 WL 4759953 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 
2014). 
190 Id. at *8. 
191 Id. at *9. 
192 See id. at *10 (holding that the use of rules was the “point of novelty” 
differentiating the claimed method from prior art cited in the patent). 
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should be.193 The claims therefore “le[ft] an abstract idea at the 
point of novelty, and prevent[ed] the development of any 
additional ways to use that abstract idea in the relevant field.”194 
The Caltech court criticized McRO’s approach, arguing that the 
point of novelty approach was rejected by Diehr, and that the 
McRO analysis conflated step one and step two of the Mayo 
inquiry.195 As a matter of form, those criticisms seem well-founded. 
Per Alice, the § 101 inquiry first identifies an abstract idea 
embodied in the claims, and secondly asks whether the application 
of that idea constitutes an inventive concept. To ask, as the McRO 
court did, whether “the only new part of the claim is an abstract 
idea,” 196  reverses that order: identification of an abstract idea 
should precede any inquiry into inventiveness.197 Moreover, under 
the analysis advocated in this Article, preemption in fact—whether 
the claim leaves “additional ways to use that abstract idea in the 
relevant field”198—should not be the focus of Mayo step two. 
However, the substance of the McRO court’s conclusions is 
consistent with Caltech and with the analytical framework 
proposed here. Most significantly, the McRO decision implicitly 
acknowledges the patent-eligibility of specific 
information-processing techniques. McRO describes three-
dimensional computer animation as “tangible” and “a specific 
technological process.”199 While not expressly challenging Digitech 
(as Caltech did), McRO’s analysis is clearly not compatible with 
Digitech’s suggestion that all information-manipulating processes 
are abstract ideas, unless tied to a specific machine.200 Further, 
Judge Wu’s concept of “abstract idea” is not far from Judge 
                                                
193 See id. at *11. 
194 Id. 
195 See Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc’n, No. 2:13-cv-97245-MRP-
JEM, 2014 WL 5661290, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014). 
196 McRO, 2014 WL 4759953 at *9. 
197 See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(“[A]ny novelty in implementation of the idea is a factor to be considered only 
in the second step of the Alice analysis.”). 
198 Id. at *11. 
199 Id. at *8. 
200 See Digitech Image Techs. v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 
1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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Pfaelzer’s. Just as Caltech proposes that the abstract idea behind 
the claim should be equated with the claim’s purpose or effect, 
McRO suggests that the abstract idea behind the claims in suit 
could be regarded as the idea that an animated human mouth 
should look a certain way when pronouncing particular sounds.201 
Under the analysis proposed in this Article, for a computational 
claim like the one in McRO to be patent-eligible, the claim must 
represent an inventive implementation of the underlying idea. 
Generic implementations, by definition, are not inventive and 
cannot contribute an inventive concept.202 While McRO speaks of 
“point of novelty” and preemption, the core of Judge Wu’s 
analysis is that the patentee’s application was generic: “So, what 
the claim adds to the prior art is the use of rules, rather than artists, 
to set the morph weights and transitions between phonemes. 
However, both of these concepts are specified at the highest level 
of generality.” 203  The court’s focus should have been on the 
application in its entirety, rather than on the novel element in the 
claims. But if McRO’s premise was that the claims represented a 
merely generic application (i.e., ‘use rules’),204 then its conclusion 
of ineligibility was correct. Alternatively, if the court’s statement 
equates to a finding that there was nothing inventive about the 
patentee’s application of the underlying idea (that an animated 
mouth should appear a certain way when pronouncing particular 
sounds), then the claims are still ineligible under the more rigorous 
standard proposed here for inventions not based on a discovery. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Mayo and Alice have made clear that the boundary between 
ineligible principle and eligible application is the addition of an 
                                                
201 See McRO, 2014 WL 4759953 at *8 (“Facially, these claims do not seem directed 
to an abstract idea. . . . They do not claim a monopoly, as Defendants argue, on 
‘the idea that the human mouth looks a certain way while speaking particular 
sounds,’ ‘applied to the field of animation.’”) (quoting defendants’ motion for 
judgment on the pleadings). 
202 See supra Part V.C. 
203 McRO, 2014 WL 4759953 at *11. 
204 See id. (suggesting that claims do no more than state an abstract idea and 
add the words ‘apply it’). 
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“inventive concept” to an underlying fundamental principle. 
Whether or not the Supreme Court has chosen the correct course, 
the Mayo framework represents an opportunity to disentangle the 
subject-matter inquiry from the contradictory muddle of the 
Court’s pre-Bilski jurisprudence. But given the heterogeneity of 
“fundamental principles,” it is unreasonable to expect that a single 
notion of “inventive concept” will draw the correct line between 
principle and application. Adopting separate standards for 
discovery-based and non-discovery-based inventions in Mayo step 
two permits a more technology-specific application of the test for 
patent-eligible subject matter, and turns the doctrine as a whole 
back towards is traditional roots. 
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